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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 In Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, we were faced with what 
we deemed “a question of considerable interest in [a] period of 
alleged rising police brutality in major cities across the 
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country”—what is sufficient evidence from which a jury can 
infer that a municipality adopted a custom of permitting its 
police officers to use excessive force?  89 F.3d 966, 967 (3d 
Cir. 1996).  More than two decades later, the interest and 
allegations persist, and, as it would appear, so does the 
question. 
 The evidence in this case demonstrates that the Internal 
Affairs Unit (“Internal Affairs”) of the since-disbanded 
Camden Police Department was woefully deficient in 
investigating civilian complaints about officer misconduct.  
Citing Beck, the District Court found this to be sufficient.  
However, the Court narrowed the case to only this evidence, 
and, as a result, did not consider its significance when 
combined with the non-Internal Affairs-related deficiencies in 
Camden’s supervision and training of its police officers.  This 
occurred in two phases:  first, the District Court unilaterally 
divided Appellant, Alanda Forrest’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
municipal liability claim into three theories, labeled failure to 
supervise through Internal Affairs, failure to supervise, and 
failure to train, and, second, it then associated the evidence 
pertaining to the deficiencies in Internal Affairs to only the first 
theory.   
 Forrest argues that this resulted in errors at various 
stages.  At summary judgment, it resulted in a grant in favor of 
Camden on the failure to supervise and train theories.  On the 
parties’ motions in limine, the Court improperly excluded 
evidence that was material to the § 1983 theory that survived 
summary judgment, and effectively awarded summary 
judgment on the state law negligent supervision claim which it 
had previously deemed triable.  The jury instructions then 
confused the relevant law regarding the sole surviving claim.     
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 We agree.  The artificial line, drawn by the District 
Court, between what were ostensibly theories with largely 
overlapping evidence resulted in erroneous rulings as to what 
was relevant, as well as instructions as to what law the jury was 
to apply.  We will therefore reverse those aspects of the District 
Court’s rulings that resulted in error, vacate part three of the 
jury verdict, and remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
  BACKGROUND 
  
 On July 1, 2008, two police officers kicked down 
several doors of the residence at 1270 Morton Street, Camden, 
New Jersey (“1270 Morton”).  According to Forrest, his 
encounter with the officers began with him pinned between the 
wall and the door of the upstairs bedroom, which had been 
kicked open.  He heard his acquaintance, Kennedy Blevins, 
twice scream, “why you beating on me[?]”  Pl.’s Resp. Br. Ex. 
64-a, at 105:10–17, ECF No. 144-76.  One officer asked, 
“where the drugs at?” and Blevins twice responded, “I don’t 
know what you talking about.”  Id.   
 Just a few hours earlier, Forrest had just finished work 
for a housing contractor at a house across the street.  He went 
to 1270 Morton Street to speak with some acquaintances.  He 
and one such acquaintance—Shahede Green—had been on the 
porch for a while when the two noticed a police car “coming 
down the opposite direction” on a one-way street.  Id. at 96:3.  
It was around midnight at this point, so Forrest decided to call 
a cab.  The two went inside as Forrest waited for the cab to 
arrive.  While waiting, Forrest heard a number of sounds that 
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caused him to be alarmed, all of which culminated in what 
sounded like someone kicking the front door. 
 At the time, the house was occupied by Forrest, Green, 
Blevins, and two women.  One of the women was known as 
Hot Dog and the other, Kesha Brown.  Forrest left Green and 
Hot Dog downstairs, and went upstairs to Blevins’s room.  
Brown was also upstairs, in bed in what is referred to as the 
“front room.”  Id. at 106:22–23.  As Forrest began explaining 
to Blevins that the front door had been kicked, Blevins’s 
bedroom door was kicked open.  Being near the bedroom door, 
Forrest reflexively stepped back, and was immediately covered 
by the door.  Forrest remained pinned between the door and the 
wall, fearing that he would immediately be shot by an officer 
if he came out from behind the door.   
 Through the opening between the door and the wall, 
Forrest heard Blevins’s screams.  He saw another officer come 
up the stairs, and moments afterwards, heard Brown scream.  
Forrest saw the officer “doing something with his arm,” but 
could not make out what the officer was doing.  Id. at 107:9–
11.  Eventually, the officer told Brown to go downstairs.  The 
officer then entered Blevins’s room, where Forrest, Blevins, 
and the other officer were located.  One of the officers swung 
the door away from Forrest, and hit him in the face, knocking 
him out.  When Forrest regained consciousness, an officer, 
later identified as Kevin Parry, was on top of him.  Officer 
Parry repeatedly punched Forrest in the face.  Officer Parry 
then handcuffed Forrest, and the officers—Parry and Jason 
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Stetser—dragged Forrest down the stairs.  Forrest suffered a 
laceration to his ear, facial bruising, and injuries to his knees.1 
 Officer Parry placed Forrest in the back seat of the 
supervising Sergeant’s vehicle.  Officer Parry proceeded to tell 
Forrest that any drugs found in the house would be attributed 
to him.  The Sergeant, Dan Morris, then took Forrest to a 
vacant parking lot, at which point Forrest asked “I’m bleeding 
like crazy.  Why you got me here?  Why don’t you take me to 
the hospital?”  Pl.’s Resp. Br. Ex. 64-b, at 134:19–21, ECF No. 
144-77.  Sergeant Morris allegedly ordered Forrest to shut up, 
and said, “my officers don’t plant drugs on people.”  Id. at 
136:25–137:2.  Officers Parry and Stetser arrived soon after, 
and Sergeant Morris passed something to Officer Parry. 
                                                 
 1 Brown’s testimony corroborates the account provided 
by Forrest, up to and including his being dragged down the 
stairs.  For example, she testified that Forrest was behind the 
door of Blevins’s room when she walked into the upstairs 
hallway, and that, after Forrest was hit in the face with the door, 
one officer “beat him up pretty bad,” at one point “hit[ting] him 
in the head with a flashlight[.]”  Pl.’s Resp. Br. Ex. 44, at 44:3–
6, ECF No. 144-20.  According to Brown, the officer hit 
Forrest “so many times” that “[h]e urinated all over himself[,]” 
“his face was swollen,” and “his head was full of blood.”  Id. 
at 45:6–11.  Brown further testified that 1270 Morton belonged 
to her, she was renting a room to Blevins, Green was her 
boyfriend, and Hot Dog was visiting on the day of the incident.  
And that she was “asleep and . . . naked from the waist down,” 
when an officer entered the front room with a flashlight.  Id. at 
20:18–24.   
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 Forrest was taken to the hospital to be treated thereafter.  
When the attending nurse inquired as to what caused his 
injuries, he simply told her that he tripped and fell.  The officers 
had previously warned that if Forrest said any more, they 
would charge him with having assaulted five officers.   
  
 In the police report he prepared regarding this incident, 
Officer Parry wrote that he had observed Forrest engaging in a 
hand-to-hand drug transaction on the porch of 1270 Morton, 
and that Forrest initiated the physical altercation with him and 
Officer Stetser.  Officer Parry testified to that version of events 
before the grand jury and claimed that Forrest was in 
possession of 49 bags of a controlled dangerous substance.  
Forrest was subsequently charged with possession of a 
controlled substance, possession with intent to distribute, 
possession within one thousand feet of a school, and resisting 
arrest. 
 Forrest filed a complaint with Internal Affairs on July 
21, 2008.  He alleged that he was assaulted by Officer Parry 
“and his partner,” which resulted in “a cut ear [that] required 
stitches, [bruises] on [his] knees, pain in [his neck], and 
headaches.”  Def.’s Mot. Ex. 33, ECF No. 138-4 at 59.  The 
complaint went nowhere, so he wrote a follow-up letter two 
months later.  The letter reiterated the assault charges and 
indicated that Internal Affairs had yet to respond to Forrest’s 
initial complaint.  Forrest ultimately pleaded guilty to 
possession with intent.  He was sentenced to three years and 
eighteen months in a New Jersey state prison. 
 Forrest served eighteen months of that sentence.  He 
was released when Officer Parry later admitted that he had 
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falsified the police report regarding the incident with Forrest.  
Specifically, Sergeant Morris, and Officers Parry and Stetser 
were three of five officers that were charged with, and pleaded 
guilty to, conspiracy to deprive individuals of their civil rights.  
Officers Stetser and Parry admitted to filing false reports, 
planting drugs, and lying under oath in front of grand juries, at 
suppression hearings, and at trials.  The investigation into their 
activities resulted in judgments vacated, charges dismissed, or 
pending indictments forfeited in over 200 criminal cases.  As 
to Forrest in particular, Officer Parry admitted that he did not 
observe a hand-to-hand drug transaction, but falsely included 
that in the report he had prepared.2 
                                                 
 2 Camden emphasizes that Forrest nonetheless admitted 
that his plea was not coerced, but rather free and voluntary.  
Appellees’ Br. 7.  In addition, at argument, it represented that 
there remains a dispute as to whether Forrest “was engaged in 
drug possession.”  Oral Arg. Audio at 23:30–24:10.  Forrest 
puts forth that this may not have been the first time that he 
freely and voluntarily entered a guilty plea to an offense he 
believed he did not commit.  He testified that, in those 
circumstances, he does not like “putting [his] life in somebody 
else’s hand” and that he would much rather take his own 
chances.  Pl.’s Resp. Br. Ex. 64a, at 60:15–20, ECF No. 144-
76.  Thus, if he thinks he is “getting another break,” he takes 
the plea.  Id. at 60:20–22. 
 He attributes this approach to when he chose to go trial 
in a case brought against him when he was a minor.  He 
testified that sometime in 1971, two police officers lured him 
from the porch of his mother’s home in Camden, accused him 
of having committed a robbery, and arrested him.  He did not 
take a plea, but “went all the way to court with it.”  Pl.’s Resp. 
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 While still in prison, Forrest brought this action in 
federal court in the District of New Jersey.  By April 2015, his 
was one of approximately 89 lawsuits brought against the City 
of Camden (“Camden”) based on the actions of the above-
referenced officers.  Camden proposed a global settlement for 
these suits,3 but Forrest opted out.  He moved forward with his 
claims, which included a municipal liability claim under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, a conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), 
and a state law claim for negligent supervision.4  Camden 
moved for summary judgment on all counts in March of 2015.  
                                                 
Br. Ex. 64, at 37:4–5, ECF No. 144-75.  He was found guilty 
and ended up serving seven months in a juvenile correctional 
facility before he was told that a mistake had been made.  
Forrest ultimately laments the situation, stating, “I think that 
might have damaged me.”  Id. at 38:23. 
 3 It has no bearing on the analysis in this case, but 
Camden also disbanded its police department, and formed a 
new one.  See, e.g., Kate Zernike, To Fight Crime, a Poor City 
Will Trade In Its Police, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/2
9/nyregion/overrun-by-crime-camden-trades-in-its-police-
force.html.   
 4 Forrest’s conspiracy claim did not survive summary 
judgment, and he does not mention this claim in his opening 
brief.  Any argument as to this claim is therefore waived.  See 
United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005) (“It 
is well settled that an appellant’s failure to identify or argue an 
issue in his opening brief constitutes waiver of that issue on 
appeal.” (citations omitted)). 
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Despite the breadth of Camden’s motion, its brief only 
mentioned Forrest’s municipal liability claim under § 1983.  
 Forrest responded in kind, with a singular focus on his 
§ 1983 claim.  His brief opposing summary judgment divided 
that claim into two:  first, he argued that, through its policy or 
custom of permitting officers to be “essentially unsupervised,” 
Camden was “the moving force” behind the constitutional 
deprivation of his rights, Pl.’s Resp. Br. 30, ECF No. 144; and 
second, that Camden’s failure to train and supervise their 
officers constituted “a deliberate indifference to the rights of 
persons those officers would come into contact with,” id. at 34.  
The evidence he cited reflects the police department’s troubled 
history in the years leading up to Forrest’s arrest, and is best 
described in six segments, all of which pertain to Camden’s 
supervision and investigation of its officers. 
 First, the New Jersey Attorney General (“NJAG”) had 
been commissioned to conduct a review of Camden’s police 
operations on five separate occasions prior to Forrest’s arrest, 
in 1986, 1996, 1998, 2002 and, most recently, 2006.  The 
NJAG twice appointed the Camden County Prosecutor to 
oversee the police department, once in 1998, and the other in 
2003.  One of the NJAG reports warned that Camden’s failure 
to commit manpower and resources to proactively managing 
police misconduct would place it “in the position of failing to 
adequately protect the civil rights of its citizens and sets the 
stage for significant civil liability.”  App. 128.  More 
specifically, with a backlog of over 350 uninvestigated 
complaints in 2002, the same report expressly cautioned: 
The number of open investigations is simply 
unacceptable and overwhelms whatever progress 
the unit may have accomplished since our last 
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review. . . .  The failure to immediately address 
the complaint backlog and, over the longer term, 
ensure that the backlog does not reoccur on a 
regular basis, could lead one to conclude that the 
City of Camden and the police department are 
deliberately indifferent to the conduct of its 
police officers and the civil rights of its citizens.   
App. 123 (emphases added).   
 Second, Camden did not address the backlog.  Rather, it 
maintained an extensive, recurring backlog in the years leading 
up to Forrest’s arrest.  The backlog was as high as 487 
complaints in 2004, and 461 in 2005, and, though declining, 
remained in 2006 and 2007, at 205, and 175, respectively.  As 
to complaints regarding excessive force, which Forrest’s 
complaint and follow-up letter alleged, Camden was 
investigating and closing a mere fraction, and sustaining an 
even smaller number.  Taken together, Camden sustained 
about 1% (7 of 622) of the complaints alleging serious 
misconduct from 2004 to 2008, consisting of excessive force, 
improper arrest, improper search, and differential treatment.5    
 Third, the evidence suggests that the investigations that 
were conducted were seriously deficient.  A representative 
                                                 
 5 Excluding Forrest’s, there were six complaints lodged 
against Officer Stetser in that span, including one for excessive 
force, one for improper arrest, and one for 
harassment/improper detainment.  Officer Parry was the 
subject of two complaints during the same time frame, one of 
which does not appear on the mechanism used to track such 
complaints. 
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example is an Internal Affairs investigative memorandum 
where the investigator did not interview witnesses, but rather 
solely based the determination on the incident reports authored 
by the officers involved.  The memorandum derived from an 
investigation into a complaint filed against Officers Stetser and 
Parry about a year before Forrest’s arrest and which contained 
allegations that were nearly identical to Forrest’s.  Indeed, the 
complainant alleged the officers planted drugs on him.  The 
Internal Affairs investigator concluded that this complaint was 
“unfounded,” which means that the complainant was “lying, 
more or less.”  Pl.’s Resp. Br. Ex. 48, at 30:11–15, ECF No. 
144-27.  This finding was premised on the incident report 
prepared by Officer Parry, which stated that he and Officer 
Stetser observed the complainant engage in a drug transaction 
in an alleyway.  The investigation into this complaint revealed 
that two similar complaints had been filed against Officer 
Stetser, and that the incident report for both—prepared by 
Stetser—also stated that each complainant was separately 
observed engaging in a drug transaction.6 
 The fourth segment is the testimony of former high 
officials in the police department, including the former Chief 
of Police, a former Deputy Chief, the former Supercession 
Executive,7 and the Sergeant who took over Internal Affairs in 
                                                 
 6 The investigation into these complaints was prompted 
by a request from the complainant’s lawyer to access the other 
two complaints. 
 
 7 The NJAG appointed the Camden County Prosecutor 
to “supercede the management, administration and operation” 
of the police department in 2003.  App. 103.  The Camden 
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2009.  Their combined testimony reflects that, in the years 
leading up to and including the year of Forrest’s arrest, there 
were deficiencies with how the department tracked officer 
whereabouts, there were no performance reviews (contrary to 
recommendations by the 2006 NJAG report) and the sergeant-
to-officer ratio was two to three times more than 
recommended. 
 Specifically, John Scott Thomson (“Chief Thomson”), 
who became Chief of the now-defunct Camden Police 
Department in 2008 and is now Chief of the newly-established 
Camden County Police Department, testified.  He explained 
that, prior to his taking over the department and at the time of 
Forrest’s arrest, the police department “relied upon what you 
wrote on your log to determine where you were” and that “an 
officer could [theoretically] write anything they wanted down 
[, since] there just wasn’t a checks and balance (sic) on it.”  
Pl.’s Resp. Br. Ex. 42-a, at 57:11–13, 65:5–8 ECF No. 144-16.  
The Supercession Executive testified that he was not aware of 
another major police department that did not have a 
performance evaluation system.  Yet despite his and the 
NJAG’s recommendations, Camden failed to implement such 
a system throughout the entirety of his term. 
 Edward Hargis, who was Deputy Chief from 2004 
through January of 2008, doubled down on that testimony, 
stating, “[a]fter [the NJAG 2006 report] was issued, we started 
                                                 
County Prosecutor later installed a Supercession Executive to, 
inter alia, manage the day-to-day activities of the police 
department, and represent the County Prosecutor in overseeing 
all department activities.  The Supercession Executive was 
installed in 2006 and remained until 2008. 
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designing a performance evaluation [system], but then it did 
not become much of a concern.”  Pl.’s Resp. Br. Ex. 40, at 
35:15–36:17, ECF No. 144-8.  Along those lines, the Sergeant 
who took over Internal Affairs in 2008 testified that the officer-
to-sergeant ratio is supposed to be five to seven officers to a 
sergeant.  Yet, between 2004 and 2009, the Supercession 
Executive stated that “they were woefully over in number” in 
some commands, with “12, 15 plus to a sergeant.”  Pl.’s Resp. 
Br. Ex. 41-b, at 137:1–6, ECF No. 144-13.   
 Chief Thomson ultimately commented that one of the 
most pressing problems facing the department when he took 
over in 2008 was a “culture of apathy and lethargy”—by which 
he meant that there were no “mechanisms of accountability,” 
and, as such, “CPD was an organization in which you could 
have the greatest cop in the world or the laziest cop in the world 
. . . .”  Pl.’s Resp. Br. Ex. 41-c, at 37:23–39:4, ECF No. 144-
15.  
 Fifth, Officers Parry and Stetser were aware of the 
alleged inadequacies in supervision.  Officer Parry explained 
that he continued to engage in illicit behavior even when 
Sergeant Morris could no longer cover for him as his 
supervisor.  When asked whether he was concerned that a 
Sergeant who was not a party to the conspiracy would 
“discover what was going on,” Officer Parry responded, “No. 
. . . Because, like I said, nobody seemed to care.”  Pl.’s Resp. 
Br. Ex. 68, at 36:2 to 37:7, ECF No. 144-87.  He noted that, in 
fact, supervision was worse after Sergeant Morris stopped 
supervising him, stating: 
Because the more sergeants had to do, the more 
that—you know, the more paperwork that had to 
be completed for our squad, the less they were on 
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the street and there was no supervision for them 
. . . [B]ecause before if you were on regular 
patrol, if you were at a job, a sergeant was on the 
street with you.  They would show up a lot of 
times.  Sergeants were getting so, you know, 
backed up with paperwork, they were really 
never around. . . .  These guys, like I said, they 
would take their liberties because they knew that 
nobody was going to be around and they had to 
answer no questions.   
Id. at 28:22 to 29:17.  And when Sergeant Morris was their 
supervisor, Officer Parry testified that he and Officer Stetser 
had no concern about their misconduct, as it was very rare that 
a Captain or Lieutenant would show up or review their reports.  
Nor did concern about complaints being filed with Internal 
Affairs ever cross their mind.  Worse yet, Officer Stetser also 
testified that, Lieutenant Pike, his supervisor at one point, 
“most likely” knew that he was writing false reports and 
accepted them.  Pl.’s Resp. Br. Ex. 54-a, at 40:16–18, ECF No. 
144-43. 
 Sixth, Officer Vautier, a fellow officer at the time, 
testified about two incidents in which Officer Stetser engaged 
in questionable behavior in front of his superiors without 
reprimand.  The first took place in Spring of 2007 when Officer 
Stetser put drugs in a Lieutenant’s bag in front of the entire 
squad as a prank.  According to the officer, the Lieutenant 
discovered this and did nothing.  The officer also testified that 
he reported this, as well as that Officer Stetser bragged about 
passing out drugs at parties, to a Sergeant within Internal 
Affairs.  The Sergeant responded by confirming that there had 
been other complaints about Officer Stetser’s passing out drugs 
at parties, but never wrote anything down and kept the report 
 16 
off the record.  The second incident was in May of 2007, and 
involved a Sergeant who conducted an integrity test on Officer 
Stetser, whereby he placed a precise amount of an illegal 
substance in a bag and handed it to Officer Stetser to turn it in 
before the end of the day.  Officer Stetser failed—he was given 
45 bags and only turned in 30.   
* * * * * 
 Camden prevailed.  The District Court granted partial 
summary judgment.  It divided Forrest’s § 1983 claim into 
three theories that it devised.  Each theory was then associated 
with a specific subset of the above segments, without 
consideration of the segments’ combined impact on any 
particular theory.  The result is that, along with Forrest’s state 
law negligent supervision claim, only one of the theories was 
considered to have the evidentiary support necessary to survive 
summary judgment.  This surviving theory was then narrowly 
framed as a failure to supervise through the Internal Affairs 
process, which again reflected the Court’s view that 
supervision-related deficiencies that were apparent elsewhere 
were not relevant to the incident with Forrest.   
 The jury returned a verdict in favor of Camden on the § 
1983 theory that was presented to them.  In parts one and two 
of the verdict form, it unanimously found that Officers Stetser 
and Parry violated Forrest’s Fourth Amendment right to be free 
from excessive force and to be free from false arrest.  But, in 
part three, the jury found that Forrest had not proved that these 
deprivations of his constitutional right resulted from Camden’s 
actions. 
 Forrest appealed. 
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  DISCUSSION8 
 Forrest challenges the District Court’s rulings at various 
stages of the underlying proceedings.  At summary judgment, 
he argues that the District Court erred in granting Camden’s 
motion on any portion of his § 1983 claim.  Regarding the 
Court’s rulings at the motions in limine hearing, he argues that 
it effectively awarded summary judgment on his state law 
negligent supervision claim, and improperly excluded 
evidence that was material to the remaining portion of his § 
1983 claim.  Lastly, Forrest contends that the Court issued jury 
instructions that were erroneous and prejudicial as to the § 
1983 claim.   
 We agree that there were several errors below, 
beginning with some of the District Court’s rulings at summary 
judgment.  Indeed, the Court unilaterally divided Forrest’s 
claim into three theories it devised—failure to supervise 
through the Internal Affairs process, failure to supervise, and 
failure to train.  To support that division, the District Court 
considered the Internal Affairs-related evidence—consisting 
of segments one through four—as only supporting the first 
theory.  In turn, the first theory was the only that survived 
summary judgment.  We conclude that aspects of all three 
theories should survive when the evidence, consisting of 
segments one through six, is considered in its entirety.  
Moreover, the District Court’s subsequent efforts to exclude 
the segments that supported the theories that did not survive 
summary judgment resulted in erroneous evidentiary rulings as 
                                                 
 8 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1331, 1367(a); we have jurisdiction over appeals from all final 
decisions by the District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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to what was relevant, as well as incorrect instructions as to 
what claims the jury was required to consider and the requisite 
legal elements.  We will therefore reverse the portions of the 
District Court’s summary judgment and evidentiary rulings 
that resulted in error, vacate part three of the verdict rendered 
by the jury, and remand for further proceedings.  
 Summary Judgment 
 Standard 
 Our review of a district court’s decision at summary 
judgment is plenary, and we apply the same standard as the 
District Court.  See Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 287 (3d 
Cir. 2014).  We determine whether the moving party has 
established that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  See Wharton v. 
Danberg, 854 F.3d 234, 241 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56(a)).  We view all facts in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party and draw all inferences in that party’s favor.  
Id.  The elements of the underlying claim are central to our 
determination, as a fact is only material if it might affect the 
outcome of the suit under the governing law.  See 
Scheidemantle v. Slippery Rock Univ. State Sys. of Higher 
Educ., 470 F.3d 535, 538 (3d Cir. 2006).  We therefore begin 
our discussion with an examination of the underlying elements 
of the species of § 1983 claim that Forrest presented to the 
District Court. 
 As we recently reiterated, a § 1983 claim against a 
municipality may proceed in two ways.  Estate of Roman v. 
City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798–99 (3d Cir. 2019).  A 
plaintiff may put forth that an unconstitutional policy or 
custom of the municipality led to his or her injuries, id. at 798 
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(citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 
(1978)), or that they were caused by a failure or inadequacy by 
the municipality that “reflects a deliberate or conscious 
choice,” see id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 215 (3d Cir. 2001)).  
The latter avenue arose in the failure-to-train context, but 
applies to other failures and inadequacies by municipalities, 
including those related to supervision and discipline of its 
police officers.  Id. at 798–99 (“[Plaintiff] has not pled a 
municipal policy . . . [but] has . . . adequately pled that the City 
failed to train, supervise, and discipline its police officers.”). 
 Plaintiffs that proceed under a municipal policy or 
custom theory must make showings that are not required of 
those who proceed under a failure or inadequacy theory, and 
vice versa.  Notably, an unconstitutional municipal policy or 
custom is necessary for the former theory, but not for the latter, 
failure or inadequacy theory.  Id. at 798 (“[F]or failure-to-train 
claims . . .[,] a plaintiff need not allege an unconstitutional 
policy.”) (citing Reitz v. County of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 145 
(3d Cir. 1997)).  This difference can be significant because a 
plaintiff presenting an unconstitutional policy must point to an 
official proclamation, policy or edict by a decisionmaker 
possessing final authority to establish municipal policy on the 
relevant subject.  And, if alleging a custom, the plaintiff must 
evince a given course of conduct so well-settled and permanent 
as to virtually constitute law.  Id.  On the other hand, one whose 
claim is predicated on a failure or inadequacy has the separate, 
but equally demanding requirement of demonstrating a failure 
or inadequacy amounting to deliberate indifference on the part 
of the municipality.  See id.  This consists of a showing as to 
whether (1) municipal policymakers know that employees will 
confront a particular situation, (2) the situation involves a 
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difficult choice or a history of employees mishandling, and (3) 
the wrong choice by an employee will frequently cause 
deprivation of constitutional rights.  Carter v. City of 
Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339, 357 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 Although we have acknowledged the close relationship 
between policy-and-custom claims and failure-or-inadequacy 
claims, Barks v. First Corr. Med, 766 F.3d 307, 316–17 (3d 
Cir. 2014), the avenues remain distinct:  a plaintiff alleging that 
a policy or custom led to his or her injuries must be referring 
to an unconstitutional policy or custom, and a plaintiff alleging 
failure-to-supervise, train, or discipline must show that said 
failure amounts to deliberate indifference to the constitutional 
rights of those affected.  That is not to say that the plaintiffs 
cannot be one and the same, with claims sounding in both.  
They can.  See id. at 798–99 (“[Plaintiff] has sufficiently 
alleged a custom of warrantless or nonconsensual searches . . . 
[and] has also adequately pled that the City failed to train, 
supervise, and discipline its officers.”). 
 Analysis 
 With that understanding, recall that, in his brief 
opposing summary judgment, Forrest purported to divide his § 
1983 municipal liability claim into two theories.  One alleged 
that a policy or custom of “essentially unsupervised” officers 
was the “moving force” behind the constitutional deprivation 
of his rights.  Pl.’s Resp. Br. 30, ECF No. 144.  The other 
alleged that Camden’s failure to train and supervise their 
officers constituted deliberate indifference to the rights of 
individuals with whom the officers would come into contact.  
Id. at 34.   
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 The District Court did not adopt that framing, and 
instead further divided the claim into three separate theories.  
It described them as, first, “that [Internal Affairs] was 
inadequate and provided no accountability for Stetser and 
Parry[,]” second, “that the City’s supervisory structure and 
inadequate monitoring system left Stetser and Parry 
unsupervised[,]” and third, “that Stetser and Parry received 
inadequate training because training about how to recognize 
and eradicate excessive force and misconduct was necessary.”  
App. 14 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Further, the 
District Court enunciated the legal requirements for all three 
theories as that Forrest had to demonstrate a policy or custom 
as to the alleged failures or inadequacies and that said policy 
or custom amounted to deliberate indifference.9   
                                                 
 9 In setting forth the law, the District Court purports to 
rely on our decision in Beck.  See App. 7 (citing Beck, 89 F.3d 
at 972, for the proposition that, “[w]hile the Supreme Court 
originally fashioned ‘the deliberate indifference’ doctrine in 
the context of a city’s alleged failure to train its police officers, 
the Third Circuit has since adopted this standard in other policy 
and custom situations.” (emphasis added)).  The portion of 
Beck cited by District Court quotes language from our decision 
in Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042 (3d Cir. 
1991), which references a policy or custom of deliberate 
indifference.  However, contrary to what the District Court’s 
opinion suggests, neither Beck nor Simmons established a 
species of § 1983 municipal liability predicated on the 
existence of an unconstitutional policy or custom of or 
amounting to deliberate indifference.  Beck involved a claim 
regarding an unconstitutional policy or custom of tacitly 
authorizing police officers to use excessive force in violation 
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 Forrest does not challenge the District Court’s ruling 
regarding the first theory—that a policy or custom of 
inadequate supervision through Internal Affairs amounted to 
deliberate indifference—as it survived summary judgment.  
But he does take issue with how he was allowed to proceed on 
that claim.  We take up those challenges in subsections (B), 
(C), and (D).  We now turn our focus to Forrest’s challenges to 
the District Court’s ruling regarding his failure-to-supervise 
and failure-to-train theories. 
 At the outset, we emphasize that, properly considered, 
there are two ways in which Forrest’s § 1983 claim against 
Camden may have proceeded:  first, that Camden’s policy or 
custom of permitting excessive force, false arrest, or other 
constitutional violations led to Forrest’s injuries; and/or 
second, that Camden’s failure to supervise, discipline, or train 
its officers amounted to deliberate indifference to the rights of 
the individuals with whom those officers would come into 
contact.  As a result, the bare notion that a custom or policy of 
“essentially unsupervised” officers led to Forrest’s injury has 
no basis in law.  See Pl.’s Resp. Br. 30, ECF No. 144.  We 
therefore consider his claim as sounding in the latter—that 
Camden’s failure to supervise, investigate, and train its officers 
amounted to deliberate indifference.     
 Despite incorrectly announcing that Forrest had to 
demonstrate an unconstitutional policy or custom of, or 
                                                 
of the Fourth Amendment.  Beck, 89 F.3d at 968.  Similarly, 
Simmons involved an alleged policy that violated the Eighth 
Amendment—that is, one of “deliberate indifference to the 
medical needs of intoxicated and potentially suicidal 
detainees.”  Simmons, 946 F.2d at 1064. 
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amounting to, deliberate indifference, the District Court treated 
Forrest’s claim as we will:  it properly conducted a deliberate 
indifference analysis for each alleged failure on the part of 
Camden.  However, it divided up the quantum of evidence to 
the detriment of Forrest’s failure-to-supervise theory and 
adopted an unduly narrow view of the evidence supporting 
Forrest’s failure-to-train theory. 
 Per the evidentiary division, the lion’s share of the 
evidence we laid out in Section I.C.—four out of the six 
segments—was associated with only the first theory, which the 
Court labeled “Failure to Supervise, Investigate, and 
Discipline.”  App. 16.  This consisted of the evidence that 
Internal Affairs had substantial backlogs and was not 
adequately investigating complaints in the years leading up to 
Forrest’s arrest, as well as the evidence of a lack of adequate 
supervision based on the absence of a system of progressive 
discipline and any mechanism to track officer performance. 
 Despite its overlap with the first theory, the second 
theory, labeled “Failure to Supervise,” App. 21, was limited to 
the evidence pertaining to Camden’s failure to track officer 
whereabouts, “CPD’s supervisory structure, and generally 
inadequate supervision of its officers’ day-to-day activities . . . 
.”  App. 21–22.  The District Court did not mention the 
evidence suggesting that the particular officers at issue 
engaged in illicit conduct knowing that that they were not 
being supervised, and the testimony regarding the two 
incidents that should have alerted the officers’ superiors but did 
not.  Nor did the Court consider how, if taken together, the 
quantum of evidence laid out in Section I.C. supported a 
failure-to-supervise theory.  Camden’s motion was ultimately 
denied as to the “Failure to Supervise, Investigate, and 
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Discipline” theory, but granted as to the “Failure to Supervise” 
theory.  App. 21–22.   
 A different, yet equally problematic narrowing occurred 
with regard to the third theory, labeled “Failure to Train.”  App. 
22.  The District Court construed this theory as merely focusing 
on the inadequacies in Camden’s training program, as it 
pertained to Officers Stetser and Parry.  See App. 22–23 
(stating, “Plaintiff has not adequately demonstrated that the 
training Parry and Stetser received was so deficient as to reflect 
[Camden]’s deliberate indifference to constitutional rights.”).  
It then granted Camden’s motion. 
 We will reverse the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment on the failure to supervise theory, and, to the extent 
that it overlooked Forrest’s allegations regarding the training 
supervisors received, also its ruling on the failure to train 
theory.   
 Failure to Supervise 
 The evidence presented by Forrest may convince a 
reasonable jury that Camden’s failure to supervise and 
discipline its officers amounted to deliberate indifference to the 
rights of individuals with whom those officers would come into 
contact.  The record would support a finding that Camden’s 
policymakers knew that their officers would require 
supervision, that there was a history of officer supervision 
being mishandled, and that, in the absence of such supervision, 
constitutional violations were likely to result.  Indeed, the 
evidence suggesting that the particular officers at issue 
engaged in illicit conduct—often consisting of false arrest and 
excessive force—knowing that that they were not being 
supervised, and that there were a few incidents that should have 
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alerted the officers’ superiors, but did not, is significant.  Those 
evidentiary points combined with the NJAG reports, the 
evidence regarding Internal Affairs’ complaint backlog and 
other deficiencies, and the testimonies offered by Chief 
Thomson, the Supercession Executive, former Deputy Chief 
Hargis, and the Sergeant who took over Internal Affairs in 
2009, is sufficient to withstand a motion for summary 
judgment. 
 Camden argues that Forrest cannot demonstrate a nexus 
between the deprivation he suffered and Camden’s conduct 
because, in the months leading up to Forrest’s arrest, its hands 
were tied.  To support that argument, it cites its internal 
processes:  when Internal Affairs received a complaint, it 
forwarded that complaint to the Camden County Prosecutor’s 
Office (“CCPO”), and took no further action.  Id. at 8.  It left 
the investigation entirely up to the CCPO.  Id.  Camden asserts 
that this process was in effect with respect to Officers Stetser 
and Parry in 2008, and, as such, Internal Affairs’s 
investigations of those officers were stayed up to and through 
the time of Forrest’s arrest.  Id. at 8.   
 We reject this argument for two reasons.  First, as the 
District Court pointed out, Camden’s own submission 
demonstrates that the CCPO did not take over investigations 
into Officers Stetser and Parry until September 16, 2008, well 
over two months after Forrest’s arrest.  See Def.’s Mot. Ex. 29, 
ECF No. 138-4 at 13.  Second, even assuming that was not the 
case, there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether 
Internal Affairs’s investigation would have resulted in 
Forrest’s arrest (and the surrounding incident) being prevented.  
Indeed, even when Camden did investigate complaints against 
these officers, its investigation amounted to a review of the 
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false reports they prepared, and thus resulted in no disciplinary 
action against the officers.   
 We will therefore reverse the District Court’s decision 
granting summary judgment as to the § 1983 claim that 
Camden’s failure to supervise its officers amounted to 
deliberate indifference to the rights of individuals with whom 
those officers would come into contact. 
 Failure to Train 
 As to the failure to train theory, Forrest’s arguments to 
the District Court did not only focus on the training Officers 
Stetser and Parry received, but also the training that 
supervising officers received.  Pl.’s Resp. Br. 35 (arguing that 
“training session[s] for officers, supervisors and command 
officers about how to recognize and eradicate excessive force 
and misconduct [are] necessary”).  Forrest reiterates the same 
two-part argument on appeal:  that “the training provided to 
Stetser and Parry . . . was inadequate” and “[s]imilarly, training 
for supervisors was deficient, as sergeants did not receive 
training geared toward officer discipline.”  Appellant’s Op. Br. 
40.   
 We agree with the District Court that evidence 
regarding the training that officers received is insufficient as a 
matter of law.  The alleged deficiency in a training program 
must be closely related to the alleged constitutional injury 
because “[i]n virtually every instance where a person has had 
his or her constitutional rights violated by a city employee, 
[said] plaintiff will be able to point to something the city ‘could 
have done’ to prevent the unfortunate incident.”  City of 
Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989) (citation 
omitted).  
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 Here, even if we accept that, based on the sheer volume 
of complaints, Camden had to have known that it had a 
problem with officers violating the constitutional rights of 
citizens, the link between that and the alleged deficiencies in 
the training program is simply too tenuous.  The officers knew 
that their conduct was criminal, and, as the encounter in this 
case shows, used their authority to pressure victims to refrain 
from immediately reporting their activities.  As a result, there 
is no proof from which to infer that implementing the changes 
to the training program that Forrest suggests would have made 
any difference.  Lastly, in terms of awareness, the testimonial 
evidence from higher officials point to supervision and 
accountability as the critical issues, not training. 
 The opposite is true of the evidence regarding the 
inadequacies in training that supervisors received.  Camden 
policymakers knew or should have known that supervisor-level 
officers would be confronted with officer misconduct, whether 
first hand or via complaints and reports from others, and that 
the wrong choice—failure to report or admonish—would lead 
to the sort of behavior that occurred here:  officers whose 
behavior caused the deprivation of constitutional rights, but 
who had no reason to change that behavior.  And, although the 
situation does not necessarily involve a difficult choice, the 
evidence here demonstrates a genuine dispute of material fact 
as to whether supervisors had a history of mishandling this 
choice. 
 Indeed, the sheer volume of complaints from outsiders, 
coupled with the absence of any internal response may lead a 
reasonable jury to conclude that Camden was aware of 
supervisors mishandling or being unable to handle their duties.  
This is even more pronounced when one examines the 
testimonies of higher officials who expressed great concern 
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that officers were not being adequately supervised, and called 
for various measures to address that reality, including a formal 
performance evaluation system and a reduction in the 
supervisor-to-officer ratio.  See also App. 128 (warning that 
Camden’s failure to commit manpower and resources to 
proactively managing police misconduct would place it “in the 
position of failing to adequately protect the civil rights of its 
citizens and set the stage for significant civil liability.”).  
 The call for these measures was warranted and the need 
for training apparent.  The testimony provided by Officers 
Stetser and Parry reflects that they were aware that supervision 
was lacking, whether co-conspirator Sergeant Morris covered 
for them or not.  Officer Stetser, in particular, explained that 
one of his supervisors “most likely” knew that he was writing 
false reports, and accepted them.  Pl.’s Resp. Br. Ex. 54-a at 
40:16–18, ECF No. 144-43.  The record further provides ample 
basis for this confidence.  Recall that Officer Stetser failed an 
integrity test administered by a supervising officer, and 
pranked another by planting drugs in the supervising officer’s 
bag.  When this was reported to a Sergeant in Internal Affairs, 
the Sergeant merely responded with his own account of similar 
behavior by Officer Stetser in other contexts.  See Supra 
Section I.C., Segment Six. 
 The foregoing demonstrates Camden’s policymakers 
were aware that Camden needed a large shake up in its 
supervisory regime.  It also raises significant questions as to 
whether Camden’s supervisor-level officers were adequately 
trained on how to discipline and combat officer misconduct 
when it was brought to their attention, including the kinds of 
misconduct—false arrest and excessive force—that led to 
Forrest’s injuries.  Thus, while we agree that Forrest’s claim 
regarding the adequacy of the training officers received fails 
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on causation grounds, we conclude that a genuine dispute of 
material fact exists as to whether the need for more or different 
training for supervisors was obvious, and the failure to provide 
that was very likely to result in a violation of constitutional 
rights.  We will therefore reverse the District Court’s summary 
judgment ruling as to this iteration of Forrest’s § 1983 claim. 
 Motions in Limine 
 Forrest presents two challenges to the District Court’s 
decisions on the motions in limine.  He argues that the District 
Court improperly granted summary judgment on his state law 
negligent supervision claim, and excluded evidence that was 
material to his surviving § 1983 claim.  We agree—the District 
Court sua sponte granted summary judgment without 
providing the procedural safeguards the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure require before judgment on the merits can be 
granted.  We also agree that the Court’s evidentiary rulings 
constituted an abuse of discretion, as they stemmed from an 
incorrect, narrow view of Forrest’s surviving § 1983 claim.    
 State Law Negligent Supervision Claim 
 The District Court ruled that Forrest’s state law 
negligent supervision claim survived summary judgment.  But 
there is no mention of the claim for the remainder of the 
proceedings, including at trial.  On appeal, Forrest contends 
that the District Court effectively granted summary judgment 
on that claim at the motions-in-limine hearing.  Appellant Op. 
Br. 42–43.  He argues that this is clear from District Court’s 
opening remark at that hearing that the only remaining claim 
was the failure to supervise through Internal Affairs.  Id. at 43.  
Camden counters that Forrest waived this issue by failing to 
object when the District Court made that remark.  Appellee 
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Resp. Br. 40.  We first address the District Court’s remark and 
its effect, and then the question of plain error. 
 The District Court’s Remark 
 It is well-settled that district courts may grant summary 
judgment sua sponte, so long as the losing party is given notice 
when summary judgment is being contemplated.  See Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(f) (permitting a sua sponte grant “[a]fter giving 
notice and a reasonable time to respond . . .”); Gibson v. Mayor 
& Council of City of Wilmington, 355 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 
2004) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326 
(1986));  see also Otis Elevator Co. v. George Washington 
Hotel Corp., 27 F.3d 903, 910 (3d Cir. 1994).  The purpose is 
to give the losing party the opportunity to marshal all the 
evidence that would be used to oppose summary judgment.  
Gibson, 355 F.3d at 224.  Along those lines, although motions 
in limine are not designed to eliminate claims or theories, see 
Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 913 F.2d 1064, 1069 (3d 
Cir. 1990), the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not prohibit 
a grant of summary judgment when said motions have been 
filed.  Whenever the summary judgment ruling is made, the 
court must provide the parties with adequate notice and an 
opportunity to oppose.  Id. at 1069–70 (finding notice 
inadequate where neither the parties nor the court suggested 
the possibility of trial not going forward). 
 In the past, we have determined that a motion in limine 
resulted in a sua sponte grant of summary judgment based on 
an express statement by the district court, see Brobst v. 
Columbus Servs. Int’l, 761 F.2d 148, 154 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(quoting the district court as having stated, “The court finds, as 
a matter of law, that . . .”) (emphasis added), or, indirectly, by 
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way of the court having eliminated the evidentiary basis for a 
claim, see Bradley, 913 F.2d at 1069–70. 
 The situation here is different.  The District Court did 
not make an express statement, at least not one outright 
purporting to grant summary judgment.  Nor did it necessarily 
eliminate the evidentiary basis for Forrest’s state law negligent 
supervision claim, given the evidentiary overlap with his 
surviving § 1983 claim.  Instead, Forrest’s argument is 
premised on the District Court’s lone remark that, “This is the 
only claim left in the case, the failure to supervise through the 
Internal Affairs process.”  App. 345.  But these are differences 
without a distinction.  The principle remains:  whether 
expressly or in effect, a district court may not grant summary 
judgment without providing the losing party notice, or a notice-
equivalent, and an opportunity to oppose.  See Gibson, 355 
F.3d at 223 (citing Otis, 27 F.3d at 910).   
 Thus, as we ordinarily would, we examine whether the 
Court granted summary judgment on Forrest’s state law 
negligence claim, and, if so, whether Forrest had adequate 
notice and an opportunity to oppose.   
 By itself, the District Court’s remark that “the failure to 
supervise through the Internal Affairs process” was “the only 
claim left in the case” is ambiguous, at best.  By the time the 
District Court makes this statement, the case had been 
narrowed to two claims:  a § 1983 claim on the theory that 
“[Camden]’s Internal Affairs system was inadequate and 
provided no accountability . . . [,]” App. 14; and a state law 
negligent supervision claim “on the theory that the internal 
affairs department provided inadequate supervision of its 
officers,” App. 24.  Thus, a remark that the only remaining 
claim is the failure to supervise through Internal Affairs leads 
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one to ask:  is it the § 1983 or the state law?  The answer can 
be found in the remainder of the Court’s other statements at the 
motions-in-limine hearing, as well as the jury instructions and 
verdict form.  
 The remainder of the Court’s motions-in-limine 
statements demonstrate that the remark at issue was referring 
to the § 1983 claim as the only remaining claim.  Specifically, 
in the moments before making the remark Forrest cites, the 
District Court stated, “I’m going to start with the order in which 
[the motions] were filed on the docket.  And the first is number 
164, which is defendant’s motion to bar evidence unrelated to 
the Monell claim.”  App. 345.  The Court then proceeded to 
explain that “there are no training claims left in the case,” and, 
having narrowed the surviving municipal liability claim to the 
theory involving the inadequate supervision provided through 
Internal Affairs, stated, “This is the only claim left in the case, 
the failure to supervise through the Internal Affairs process.”  
Id.   
 The jury instructions and verdict form further 
demonstrate that Forrest’s state law claim was not the claim 
being referred to as the only one remaining.  This claim is 
absent from the portion of the jury instructions that sets forth 
what the jury was to consider.  Instead, the jury is instructed 
that, “[t]he plaintiff, Alanda Forrest, is suing under Section 
1983 . . . .”  App. 456.  As to the verdict form, the portion 
identifying the claims against Camden singularly asks,  
“Has plaintiff proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the deprivation of Alanda Forrest’s 
constitutional right(s) was the proximate result 
of a well-settled policy of inadequate supervision 
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by the City of Camden of its officers, including 
Jason Stetser and/or Kevin Parry?”  
App. 442.   
 This singular ask is particularly significant because, as 
the District Court noted at summary judgment, Forrest’s state 
law negligent supervision claim was an independent claim, 
with distinct elements.  See App. 24.  Notably, the claim is not 
limited to injuries arising from constitutional violations, and 
neither requires that the plaintiff’s injuries result from a well-
settled policy or custom nor a showing of deliberate 
indifference.  Rather, the consensus is that a negligent 
supervision claim under New Jersey law only requires a 
relatively straightforward negligence showing—that is, that 
the employer knew or had reason to know the employee 
exhibited dangerous characteristics, that there was a reasonable 
foreseeability of harm to others, and that the negligent 
supervision was the proximate cause of the injuries.  Panarello 
v. City of Vineland, 160 F. Supp. 3d 734, 769 (D.N.J. 2016); 
see also Smith v. Harrah's Casino Resort of Atl. City, 2013 WL 
6508406, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013) (“Several 
jurisdictions have held that a claim of negligent supervision 
requires proof of the same elements recited by our Supreme 
Court . . . with respect to a claim of negligent hiring.”). 
 With all that in view, we conclude the District Court’s 
statement amounted to a sua sponte grant of summary 
judgment as to Forrest’s state law negligent supervision claim. 
 We also conclude that the Court did so without 
providing Forrest with notice and an opportunity to respond.  
Indeed, prior to its sua sponte grant, the Court held that 
Forrest’s state law negligent supervision claim would be tried, 
 34 
and had not made any interim rulings that would contradict 
that.  See App. 23–24.  So, as of the time of the Court’s remark, 
Forrest had no reason to believe that this claim was at risk of 
an adverse summary judgment ruling.10   
 Plain Error 
 Camden argues that even if the District Court’s grant 
constituted error, we should not reverse because Forrest 
waived this issue by failing to object.  Forrest counters that the 
failure to object can be excused because the issue qualifies 
under our plain error doctrine.  We agree with Forrest.   
 Where a timely objection is not raised below, we reverse 
only where the grant constitutes plain error.  See Gibson, 355 
F.3d at 255 n.4 (citing United States v. Knight, 266 F.3d 203, 
206 (3d Cir. 2001)).  In this context, this is true where we find 
(1) an error, (2) that is plain—i.e., clear and obvious—and (3) 
the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights.  See 
                                                 
 10 Forrest points to the Joint Pre-Trial Order as evidence 
that he had reason to believe that his state law negligence claim 
would be tried.  However, the document is, at best, ambiguous 
on this point.  Under a subsection labeled “PLAINTIFF’S 
LEGAL ISSUES:” it lists the issue of whether “[Camden was] 
negligent in failing to adequately supervise and monitor the 
actions of its police officers.”  Joint Pretrial Order 35, ECF No. 
161.  But, like the District Court’s remark, it does not specify 
whether this is referring to the state law negligent supervision 
claim or Forrest’s § 1983 claim.  For our purposes, it is enough 
that the District Court’s summary judgment opinion indicated 
that this claim would be tried, and the record is devoid of any 
interim ruling or reference that suggested otherwise.  
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Walden v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 126 F.3d 506, 522 (3d Cir. 
1997); see also Selkridge v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 360 
F.3d 155, 166 (3d Cir. 2004).  Even then, we exercise our 
power to reverse “sparingly”—that is, only for “serious and 
flagrant” errors jeopardizing “the integrity of the proceeding.”  
Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation v. Canon-
McMillan School Dist., 152 F.3d 228, 234 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 The District Court’s sua sponte grant constituted such 
an error.  It is well established that noncompliance with the 
notice provisions of the Federal Rules deprives a court of the 
authority to grant summary judgment.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) 
(permitting a sua sponte grant only “[a]fter giving notice and a 
reasonable time to respond . . .”).  And, as a result of the 
District Court’s noncompliance, the plaintiff was deprived of a 
jury trial on a claim that the Court previously deemed triable—
in other words, a designation that a reasonable jury could find 
in his favor—despite there being no change in the quantum of 
evidence between the designation and subsequent deprivation.   
 The seriousness of this error cannot be overstated:  it not 
only deprived a litigant of his day in court, but it effectively 
designated a matter for the jury and then stepped into the jury’s 
province to decide the same matter.  All of this occurred 
without any explanation, and in a procedural setting that serves 
an entirely different function:  on the parties’ motions in 
limine, rather than on a dispositive motion.  See Gibson, 355 
F.3d at 224 (issuing a cautionary note that “the sua sponte grant 
of summary judgment, without giving notice to the parties, is 
not the preferred method by which to dispose of claims . . . 
because [courts] run the risk of unduly prejudicing the parties 
. . . [and] such grants . . . can have serious, if unintended, 
consequences.”). 
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 We will reverse and remand, with the instruction that 
the claim should go to the jury unless the District Court seeks 
to grant summary judgment on it.  If the Court so seeks, it may 
grant summary judgment only after providing adequate notice 
and opportunity for Forrest to oppose.   
 The District Court’s Evidentiary Rulings 
 A ruling on the admissibility of evidence is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion.  Forrest v. Beloit Corp., 424 F.3d 344, 349 
(3d Cir. 2005).  There is an abuse of discretion if the district 
court’s decision “rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, 
errant conclusion of law, or an improper application of law to 
fact.”  Id. (quoting Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136, 146 
(3d Cir. 2000)).   
 The District Court excluded evidence of conduct that (a) 
post-dated Forrest’s arrest,11 (b) was not specific to Internal 
Affairs, and (c) related to other wrongdoing by Officers Stetser 
and Parry.  It found this evidence inadmissible on the grounds 
                                                 
 11 In a footnote, Forrest also argues that the District 
Court’s exclusion of evidence that pre-dated his arrest was 
improper.  Appellant’s Br. 45 n.13.  This evidence included the 
2002 NJAG report which warned that the failure to 
immediately address the complaint backlog could lead to an 
adverse finding on deliberate indifference.  It also included 
complaints regarding Sergeant Morris, who supervised 
Officers Stetser and Parry during Forrest’s arrest.  For all the 
same reasons we set forth below, the exclusion of that evidence 
constituted an abuse of discretion—the evidence is highly 
relevant to determining deliberate indifference on the part of 
Camden. 
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that it was insufficiently related to the theory that Camden 
failed to supervise through the Internal Affairs process.  
 Under the Federal Rules, relevant evidence is generally 
admissible, and irrelevant evidence is not.  Fed. R. Ev. 402.  
Yet the bar for what constitutes relevant evidence is low.  See, 
e.g., Failla v. City of Passaic, 146 F.3d 149, 159 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(“The test of relevance under the Federal Rules of Evidence is 
low.”); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 783 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (describing the Federal Rules as having a “low 
threshold of relevancy”).  The test is whether the evidence has 
“any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence,” where “the fact is of 
consequence in determining the action.”  Fed. R. Ev. 401 
(emphasis added).12 
 The District Court framed the facts of consequence in 
this case as only those that demonstrated a failure to supervise 
through the Internal Affairs process.  In so framing the case, 
the District Court concluded that (a) evidence that post-dated 
                                                 
 
12 Camden appears to suggest that the evidence was 
properly excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which, 
in broad terms, permits the exclusion of relevant evidence if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial 
effect.  However, the District Court excluded the evidence at 
issue on Rule 401, relevancy grounds.  In addition, Camden 
does not (and we cannot) identify what prejudice, if any, would 
result from admitting the evidence at issue.  We thus construe 
Camden’s arguments as speaking to relevancy alone and 
proceed accordingly.  See Appellee Br. i. (characterizing the 
District Court’s rulings as “[p]roperly [e]xcluding [i]rrelevant” 
evidence and testimony).  
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Forrest’s arrest was not relevant because it was not causally 
connected—that is, such evidence would not have helped 
Internal Affairs prevent the incident with Forrest; (b) 
testimonies by Chief Thomson, the Supercession Executive, 
and the Camden County Prosecutor were not relevant because 
they were not specific to Internal Affairs, but referred to the 
police department in general; and (c) the complaints against 
Officers Stetser and Parry were not relevant because they did 
not concern planting drugs or excessive force.  
 The District Court’s framing of the case was unduly 
narrow and incorrect.  Forrest’s sole surviving claim was not 
that Internal Affairs failed to supervise, but, more broadly, that 
Camden failed to investigate and discipline its officers, and 
that failure amounted to deliberate indifference to the rights of 
those to whom those officers would come into contact.  To that 
effect, evidence is not irrelevant merely because it does not 
show causation, does not specifically pertain to one unit of 
Camden’s police department, or does not focus on the 
particular activities carried out by the officers that were 
involved in Forrest’s encounter.  It is only irrelevant if it bears 
on no aspect of the overarching theory and its underlying 
elements.  With that framing in mind, we conclude that the 
District Court’s evidentiary rulings constituted an abuse of 
discretion as to the evidence set forth above.   
 Post-arrest evidence is highly relevant to whether 
Camden’s failure amounted to deliberate indifference. 
 At the outset, causation is not the sine qua non of 
relevance.  The post-arrest evidence included Forrest’s 
complaint, the follow-up letter that he sent to Internal Affairs, 
and other Internal Affairs complaints regarding similar 
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misconduct by Officers Stetser and Parry.13  Although the 
failure to investigate those complaints could not have caused 
Forrest’s alleged injuries, they are highly relevant to whether 
Camden was deliberately indifferent to a continued pattern of 
police misconduct.  Specifically, Camden’s handling of 
complaints after Forrest’s arrest is highly relevant to 
demonstrating that it maintained the same practice prior to and 
at the time of said arrest.   
 We held as much in Beck.  89 F.3d at 957–68.  The case 
involved a college student, Beck, who brought an excessive 
force claim against the City of Pittsburg.  Id. at 969–70. He 
alleged that an officer used excessive force in the process of 
arresting him for driving under the influence.  Id.  Inter alia, 
Beck produced evidence that several complaints had been filed 
alleging similar acts of excessive force by the officer, some 
before and some after his arrest, but none of them were 
sustained or resulted in discipline.  Id. at 970.  As to the pre-
arrest complaint, we stated, “[it] may have evidentiary value 
for a jury’s consideration [as to] whether the City and 
policymakers had a pattern of tacitly approving the use of 
excessive force.”  Id. at 973.  We found that the post-arrest 
complaint could support an inference that policymakers knew, 
or should have known of the officer’s behavior, and, “because 
                                                 
 13 We need not reach Forrest’s argument that the District 
Court excluded the Sergeant who took over Internal Affairs’s 
testimony that, when he took over in May of 2009, “there were 
a lot of [Internal Affairs] cases open . . . and the investigations 
weren’t done,” in addition to other department-wide 
deficiencies.  See Appellant Br. 49–50.  The District Court 
ruled that the Sergeant would be permitted to testify about “the 
400 open [Internal Affairs] cases.”  See App. 365.   
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the complaints . . . came in a narrow period of time and were 
of a similar nature,” they could also support an inference that 
policymakers knew of the officer’s “propensity for violence 
when making arrests.”  Id. 
 The same is true of the evidence that was excluded by 
the District Court here.  Forrest’s complaint was filed days 
after his arrest, with a follow-up note not long after that.  In 
addition, the complaints in this case also came in a narrow 
period of time and are of a similar nature.  Indeed, the three 
related complaints are dated December 27, 2007, August 12, 
2008, and August 26, 2008, which is less than two months 
removed from Forrest’s arrest or, in the case of the first, may 
have pre-dated his arrest or was made less than six months 
after.14  In terms of the nature of the incidents, the first 
complaint contained allegations that Officers Stetser and Parry 
threw drugs on the floor and claimed that they belonged to the 
complainant.  The second alleged that Officer Stetser was 
taking drugs from drug dealers and putting them on other 
people.  And the third was that Officer Stetser slammed a minor 
onto his marked vehicle, falsely accused the minor of having 
drugs on his person, and threatened to arrest everyone inside 
the minor’s residence. 
 This evidence clearly lends credence to the notion 
Camden was aware of related, concerning conduct by its 
officers and had not responded.  It was therefore an abuse of 
                                                 
 14 The parties dispute this issue.  The ambiguity arises 
because the document containing the testimony states that the 
“Date of Occurrence” is December 27, 2007, App. 236, but the 
questioner says the date on which the testimony is being given 
is December 1, 2009. 
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discretion to exclude this evidence merely because it was not 
causally related to the incident involving Forrest.   
 The excluded testimonies are highly relevant to 
Camden’s investigative and disciplinary inadequacies, 
as well as the issue of deliberate indifference. 
 The excluded testimonies consisted of Chief Thomson’s 
statement that, when he became Chief, “the greatest weakness 
of [Camden] was a culture of apathy and lethargy,” in which 
there was “no mechanism of accountability in place”; 
Supercession Executive Venegas’s testimony that Camden 
failed to implement the NJAG 2006 report’s recommendations, 
which included a recommendation to implement formal 
personnel evaluation and progressive discipline processes; 
and, the Camden County Prosecutor’s testimony that he 
received allegations in 2005 that Officer Stetser engaged in 
criminal activity and referred those allegations to Internal 
Affairs for investigation.  We examine each, in turn. 
 The District Court’s conclusion that Supercession 
Executive Venegas’s testimony was not relevant is belied by 
the fact that it cited the crux of that testimony in its opinion 
denying Camden’s summary judgment motion.  Specifically, 
the opinion states, 
In August 2006, Arturo Venegas began his duties 
as Supercession Executive, and his consulting 
agreement implied that the Police Department 
lacked “clear standards of performance for the 
police department and its employees” and a 
“system of progressive discipline that holds both 
employees and their managers accountable for 
performance and behavior.”  While this evidence 
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does not compel a finding of Monell liability, it 
aids Plaintiff in establishing genuine issue of 
material fact suitable for a jury. 
App. 20 (emphasis added).  Simply put, evidence that aids a 
plaintiff in establishing a genuine dispute of material fact more 
than meets the low threshold set by Rule 401.   
 In addition, the record is clear that both Chief Thomson 
and Supercession Executive Venegas were directly responsible 
for all of Camden Police, including Internal Affairs.  Their 
testimony regarding Camden’s across-the-board investigatory 
and disciplinary deficiencies is thus highly relevant to 
establishing Camden’s awareness of, and response to, those 
deficiencies.  
 Finally, the District Court excluded the Camden County 
Prosecutor’s testimony that the office received allegations 
against Stetser in 2005 and referred those allegations to 
Internal Affairs.  Internal Affairs’s records do not reflect that 
referral or a subsequent investigation.  See App. 392–93.  The 
District Court deemed this evidence irrelevant because there 
was no evidence that Camden received the referral.  Camden 
defends that ruling on the additional ground that the incident 
involved an informant who could not identify a picture of 
Officer Stetser.   
 This argument and the District Court’s basis are beside 
the point.  As Forrest points out, when viewed in conjunction 
with the fact that Internal Affairs had instances in which certain 
complaints were missing, a reasonable jury could construe this 
as further evidence of the inadequacy of Camden’s 
investigatory regime.  
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 The excluded other-misconduct complaints further 
demonstrate Camden’s investigative deficiencies and is 
also highly relevant to the issue of deliberate 
indifference. 
 The excluded other-misconduct complaint was dated 
May 28, 2008, a few months prior to Forrest’s experience.  The 
complainant alleged that on May 1, 2008, he was approached 
by two officers when he came out of a Chinese restaurant after 
ordering food.  Officer Stetser approached and greeted the 
complainant in a nice manner, but then proceeded to “jump in 
his face all of a sudden (literally face to face) yelling, 
‘Motherfucker, you been watching me, motherfucker!’”  App. 
341.  The officers then handcuffed and searched the 
complainant, who then proceeded to explain that he only came 
out for some food.  The officers thereafter walked the 
complainant back to their police van and handed him a 
summons for loitering before releasing him. 
 The District Court excluded this evidence because 
“Well, it has nothing to do with planting drugs or [excessive 
force],” despite previously acknowledging that it contained an 
allegation that Officer Stetser “wrongfully arrested someone.”  
App. 376–77.  Further, while the complaint itself concerned the 
issuance of a wrongful ticket, the underlying conduct is 
analogous to what the officers exhibited with Forrest a few 
months later—that is, abruptly approaching unwitting civilians 
and flagrantly ignoring Fourth Amendment prohibitions.  
Thus, given the temporal proximity and the similarities 
between the incident and Forrest’s own experience, the District 
Court’s decision to exclude this evidence as irrelevant 
amounted to an abuse of discretion.   
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 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the District 
Court abused its discretion when it excluded evidence that 
post-dated Forrest’s arrest, albeit not specific to Internal 
Affairs or strictly related to other wrongdoing by Officers 
Stetser and Parry.   
 Jury Instruction Errors 
 Forrest did not object to the instructions provided to the 
jury.  The errors he alleges here have therefore not been 
preserved.  Rule 51(d)(2) provides that we “may consider a 
plain error in the instructions that has not been preserved . . . if 
the error affects substantial rights.”  Harvey, 635 F.3d at 609 
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(d)(2)).  Under that standard, we 
reverse only if the error is “(1) fundamental and highly 
prejudicial or if the instructions are such that the jury is without 
adequate guidance on a fundamental question and (2) our 
refusal to consider the issue would result in a miscarriage of 
justice.”  Id. at 612 (quoting Alexander v. Riga, 208 F.3d 419, 
426–27 (3d Cir. 2000).  We therefore proceed by first 
considering whether the District Court committed an error, and 
if so, whether the error meets the threshold for reversal.   
 The jury instructions errors are twofold:  first, the 
instructions confuse the jury as to the legal requirements for 
each species of § 1983 liability, and, second, it narrows the 
jury’s focus to only evidence pertaining to Internal Affairs and 
Officers Stetser and Parry.   
 Per the former, recall that the onus of demonstrating an 
official policy or custom only falls on a plaintiff whose 
municipal liability claim is predicated on an unconstitutional 
policy or custom, but that such a plaintiff need not show 
deliberate indifference on the part of the municipality.  On the 
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other hand, a plaintiff advancing a claim predicated on a 
municipality’s failure or inadequacy in training, supervision, 
or otherwise is spared from demonstrating the existence of an 
unconstitutional policy or custom but must make the deliberate 
indifference showing.  To the contrary, the jury here was 
incorrectly instructed that, in order to find a municipal liability 
for inadequate supervision, it had to find that Camden adopted 
a policy or custom of inadequate supervision amounting to 
deliberate indifference to the fact that it would “obviously 
result in the violation of an individual’s right to be free from 
unlawful arrest and excessive force.”  App. 463–64.   
 Indeed, in relevant part, the instructions begin by stating 
that the jury must find “that an official policy or custom of 
[Internal Affairs] caused the deprivation [of his constitutional 
rights].”  App. 462.  And, after presenting the requirements for 
determining whether a policy or custom existed, it frames 
Forrest’s claim as “[Camden] adopted a policy of inadequate 
supervision and that this policy caused the violation of 
[Forrest’s] right[s] . . . .” App. 463.  It then immediately follows 
with instructions that the jury must also find that Internal 
Affairs failed to adequately supervise Officers Stetser and 
Parry, and that said supervision amounted to deliberate 
indifference.  App. 463–64.  The result is confusion as to 
whether the policy or custom finding is antecedent to reaching 
the deliberate indifference inquiry, or if the two are intertwined 
in some other way. 
 Per the second error, the instructions frame the case as 
solely pertaining to the adequacy of Internal Affairs’s 
supervision of Officers Stetser and Parry, rather than the 
adequacy of Camden’s supervision and investigation of its 
officers in general.  Specifically, the instructions state that,  
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In order to hold the municipality liable for the 
violation of [Forrest’s constitutional rights] . . ., 
you must find that [Forrest] has . . . proved by 
preponderance of the evidence . . . [that] [f]irst, 
[Internal Affairs] failed to adequately supervise 
Stetser and Parry.  Second, [Internal Affairs]’s 
failure to supervise Stetser and Parry amounted 
to deliberate indifference . . . .  Third, [Internal 
Affairs]’s failure to adequately supervise[ ] 
proximately cause[d] the violation . . .    
App. 463–64 (emphasis added).  Further, in instructing the jury 
on the elements of deliberate indifference, the Court again 
directed the jury to examine whether “[Internal Affairs] knew 
that Jason Stetser and Kevin Parry would confront a particular 
situation.”  Id.15 
 In contrast, the legal requirement for deliberate 
indifference is whether “(1) municipal policymakers know that 
employees will confront a particular situation; (2) the situation 
involves a difficult choice or a history of employees 
                                                 
 
15 Forrest argues that the District Court also instructed 
the jury on the failure-to-supervise theory that did not survive 
summary judgment, rather than the failure to investigate and 
discipline theory that did.  But the District Court repeatedly 
referred to the surviving theory as one for failure to supervise, 
but only through Internal Affairs.  See App. 463 (“[O]fficials 
within [Internal Affairs] are policymaking officials for the 
issue of whether [Camden] inadequately supervised its 
officials and investigated [I]nternal [A]ffairs complaints.”) 
(emphasis added).  We are therefore not persuaded that what 
Forrest asserts amounted to error.  
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mishandling; and (3) the wrong choice by an employee will 
frequently cause deprivation of constitutional rights.”  Carter, 
181 F.3d at 357 (emphasis added).  It is not narrowed to the 
particular employees in the case.  Notably, as the record makes 
clear, the Chief of Police had ultimate authority over Camden’s 
police department and Internal Affairs but is not properly 
considered within Internal Affairs.  We therefore conclude that 
the instructions provided to the jury regarding Forrest’s § 1983 
claim constituted error.16 
                                                 
 16 At argument, Camden made the case that the jury 
instructions were not erroneous because they were consistent 
with the Third Circuit’s Model Jury Instructions.  As we 
recently reiterated, despites their label, the Third Circuit Model 
Jury Instructions are not drafted by members of this Court, and 
are thus “neither law nor precedential.”  See Robinson v. First 
State Cmty. Action Agency, 920 F.3d 182, 189–90 (3d Cir. 
2019).  We nonetheless have observed that it is unlikely that 
“the use of a model jury instruction can constitute error.”  Id. 
at 90 (quoting United States v. Petersen, 622 F.3d 196, 208 (3d 
Cir. 2010)).  To that effect, the instructions regarding 
inadequate training or supervision claims do not suggest that a 
showing of a policy or custom is required, but merely that a 
program was inadequate, that this inadequacy amounted to 
deliberate indifference, and proximately caused the violation 
complained of.  See Third Circuit Model Civil Jury Instruction 
4.6.7.  Similarly, on deliberate indifference, the same set of 
instructions ask whether the entity at issue knew that 
“employees would confront a particular situation.”  Id. 
(emphasis added).  For the reasons we have set forth, we are 
not persuaded that the District Court’s instructions were 
consistent. 
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 We also conclude that both errors meet the threshold for 
reversal.  The District Court’s instructions narrowed the 
universe of evidence that the jury could rely on to only 
evidence that pertained to Internal Affairs’ supervision of 
Officers Stetser and Parry, to the exclusion of its broader 
investigatory inadequacies.  It also left the jury without 
guidance on the fundamental question of what it needed to find 
to conclude that Camden was or was not liable.  Our failure to 
consider either error would result in a miscarriage of justice.  
We therefore consider both.  As Part 3 of the jury verdict is the 
only aspect that concerned Camden’s liability under § 1983, 
we will vacate that aspect of the verdict. 
  CONCLUSION 
 For all of the above reasons, we will reverse the above-
specified aspects of the District Court’s summary judgment 
and evidentiary rulings, vacate part three of the jury verdict, 
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
